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Abstract 
This research explores the effects of various criteria of the earnings quality on the agency costs of the companies. It attempts to 
respond to the following queries: “what are the effects of the earnings quality on the agency costs? The results of regression 
analysis suggest that there is no significant difference between the TSE market and other developed markets in the sense that a 
reverse significant relationship exists between different criteria of the earnings quality information and agency costs criteria. The 
results of MANOVA also indicate that when earnings quality information is high, the firms’ agency costs are lower. 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
In the last few decades, with flourishing trade and increasing investments in shares, the issues of separation of 
management from ownership, agency theory and the role of the financial information, have caught the attention of 
managers, investors and researchers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Consequently, special attention has focused on the 
costs of the agency. Generally, the costs of the agency are raised because of the existence of a potential conflict of 
interest which might exist between the managers (agents) and investors (principals). Given the conflict of interests 
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and incompatible objectives that might be prevalent between managements and investors, managements may take 
some actions which may jeopardize the interest of the investors. To eliminate or alleviate this obstacle, managers 
and investors should jointly agree to establish various costly contractual agreements and to establish appropriate 
control mechanisms to monitor agents’ actions, self-interest behaviour and their performances (Namazi, 2013). 
Since the actions and effort of the agents are exerted under the condition of uncertainty and these variables are not 
directly observable by the principals, some costly accounting mechanisms are also required to report and monitor 
the performance of agents. The control of this behaviour could also be costly. In addition, managers possess access 
to private information about firms’ true financial operations and performance, but stockholders do not maintain such 
access to firms’ information. The agency theory and financial literature (Namazi, 2013) unequivocally reveal that 
information disclosure can help mitigate principal-agent conflicts and costs. For instance, Ross (1979), via the 
signalling theory, reveals that a high quality firm can be signalling without any charges. In effect, signalling theory 
predicts that healthy firms are likely to disclose more information than distressed firms. In this process, information 
disclosure is one of the monitoring devices which can be adopted to reduce agency costs. Bushman & Smith (2001) 
explicitly point out that one of the fundamental objectives of the governance research is presenting evidence on the 
extent to which information provided by firms mitigate agency problems due to the separation of managers and 
outside investors. 
The preceding literatures holistically reveal that accounting information play a significant role in the agency cost 
relationship, but do not unequivocally demonstrate the precise role of the quality of earnings in this sphere. In 
addition, the significance of various quality criteria of the earnings information in providing quality information and 
their effects on the agency costs are unexplored. Furthermore, since the preceding studies have been mainly 
conducted in the developed countries and stock markets, it is not perceptible whether or not one can generalize the 
findings to developing nations and stock markets. 
2. Theoretical Basis and Literature Review 
The theoretical foundation of this research is based upon the concept of the agency theory (Namazi, 2013). Based 
on the paradigm of this theory, in the managers-owners relation, the demand for financial reporting arises from 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts which may be prevalent between the managers and outside investors. 
Hence, the disclosure of quality information by the management would reduce management-stockholder conflicts. 
In this study, it was hypothesized that quality earning information would decrease management-stockholders 
conflicts and agency costs. There is, however, no exact and comprehensive definition in regard to earnings quality. 
The relationship between earnings quality and information asymmetry within the context of the agency theory, has 
also been explored in the literature and some interesting results have been reported. For example, Bushman and 
Smith (2001) found that higher-earnings quality information would lead to decreased information asymmetry and it 
could be expended as a control mechanism to monitor agents’ actions accurately. Similarly, Bushman and Smith 
(2001) found that providing high-quality earnings information would likely reduce informational asymmetry 
problems between the firm and its investors, and hence would decrease the agency costs. An (2009) argued that 
factual and objective earnings information would lead to higher financial information transparency which ultimately 
would cause a reduction of the agency costs. Evidence of research by Chuang, Xiuhong, & Zhang (2010) showed 
that earnings quality affects the firm’s controlling agency costs significantly. Wei & Chunyan (2010) also showed 
that the lower the probability of the managers’ voluntary disclosure of the information on specific operating cash 
payments, the lesser is the degree of the voluntary disclosure. Evidence of research by Edelen, Evans, & Kadlec 
(2011) also suggests the effective role of the transparency in providing earnings information on the agency costs. 
Finally, Brown, Chen, & Kim (2015) found out that those firms close to the investment –speculative boarder line, 
would choose the most aggressive income-increasing activities. 
The preceding studies unambiguously demonstrate that disclosure and transparency of the earnings information 
are central factors in the agency relations; and information, particularly accounting information, would reduce the 
agency costs. Nevertheless, little is known about the precise role of the various criteria of the quality of earnings 
information in addressing agency costs (Edelen, Evans, & Kadlec, 2011). In this regard, studies concerning the 
examination of the role of different criteria of the quality earnings disclosure and providing information in reducing 
agency costs from different perspectives should be conducted. The major aim of this study is to investigate the latter 
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point. The strong point of the present study, which makes it distinct from prior studies in this sphere, is that it 
explores the effect of various earnings quality information on the agency costs thoroughly. 
Based on the literature review presented, the following research hypotheses are stated as follows: 
Main hypotheses: Agency costs are lower for the firms whose information on earnings quality is higher. 
Sub-hypotheses:   
1. The ratio of operating expenses to sales is lower for the firms whose accruals quality is higher. 
2. The asset turnover ratio is higher for the firms whose accruals quality is higher. 
3. The Tobin’s Q ratio is higher for the firms whose accruals quality is higher. 
4. The ratio of operating expenses to sales ratio is lower for the firms whose value of information 
relevance is higher. 
5. The asset turnover ratio is higher for the firms whose value of information relevance is higher. 
6. The Tobin’s Q ratio is higher for the firms whose value of information relevance is higher. 
7. The ratio of operating expenses to sales is lower for the firms whose information disclosure quality 
is higher. 
8. The asset turnover ratio is higher for the firms whose information disclosure quality is higher. 
9. The Tobin’s Q ratio is higher for the firms whose information disclosure quality is higher. 
3. Population and sample study  
The population of this study consists of all firms listed on the TSE. Due to the availability of published 
information, the existing qualified companies for every single year between 2004 and 2011 were selected from TSE. 
However, the following conditions were considered for selecting companies: 1) Selected firms should their stocks 
should have been traded in the TSE at least once during the last quarter of each year. 2) Selected firms should not be 
listed as the investment companies. After considering the preceding limitations, totally 67 firms were found. 
4. Variables measurement 
4.1. Independent variables 
Accruals quality and accruals quality adjusted for performance: In this study, the earnings quality was defined as 
accruals quality (AQ1) and adopted by Dechow & Dichev’s (2002) model to estimate it. Chuang, Xiuhong, & Zhang 
(2010) indicate that estimation of discretionary accruals might be significantly affected by a company’s current and 
past performance. Hence, in this study similar to Chuang, Xiuhong, & Zhang (2010), and based on Kothari, Leone, 
& Wasley (2005), accrual quality adjusted for performance was calculated. It was determined as the second criterion 
of the quality of accrual items (AQ2).
Information relevance: In this study, information relevance (IR) was formed into two of its significant sub-set 
features: predictive value and feedback value. In this study, to measure the value of the information feedback, the 
Kormendi & Lipe’s (1987) model was employed. Also, the extent of profit components was expensed to predict the 
future profit. In effect, the absolute prediction error of the following model, as a reverse criterion for measuring 
predictive power of the current income, was used:
NIi,t+1 = 0 + 1 CFOi,t  + 2TCAi,t + ei,t                                      (1) 
Disclosure quality: The indicator of the disclosure quality (DQ) (sub-sets of reliability and timeliness) was the 
score assigned to each company by the TSE organization. The score is granted by TSE according to its 
announcement of “Rating of the Firms in terms of the Disclosure Quality and Appropriate Informing”. 
4.2. Dependent variables 
The dependent variable in this research is the firm’s agency costs (AC). However, based on the current literature, 
the following criteria were used: 
Performance ratios: They consist of the operating expenses to sales ratio (ES) and asset turnover ratio (AT). 
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Tobin’s Q ratio: Tobin’s Q ratio is calculated by consistent with the research by Jurkus, Park, & Woodard (2011). 
4.3. Control variables 
In this study, the size (the natural logarithm of the average total assets and total sales), Leverage (Lev) ratio (total 
debts to total assets), board independence (BI), and ownership concentration (OC) (the percentage of shares held by 
the largest shareholder) was used as another control variables†. 
5. Findings 
The results of testing sub-hypotheses 1 to 3 are reported in Table 1. The amount of the F-statistics associated with 
each of the six models tested is indicating the significance of all models at a confidence level of 95%. The results 
indicate that there is a reverse significant relationship between accruals quality (AQ1) and accruals quality adjusted 
for performance (AQ2) with agency costs criteria.  
Table 1. Result of regression models 2 and 3 
 
Operating expenses to sales ratios Asset turnover ratios Tobin’s Q ratios 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 Model 2 Model 3 
AQ1 6.955×10-8* - -8.165×10-7* - -1.486×10-6* - 
AQ2 - 5.482×10-8* - -6.130×10-7* - -1.792×10-6* 
R2adj 0.052 0.044 0.146 0.091 0.113 0.159 
F-statistics 5.398* 4.677* 14.665* 9.073* 11.182* 16.116* 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1AQ1i,t + σ Ⱦହ୬ୀଶ nControl Variables + İi,t                    (2) 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1AQ2i,t + σ Ⱦହ୬ୀଶ nControl Variables + İi,t                    (3) 
 
The results of testing sub-hypotheses 4 to 9 are reported in Table 2. The amount of F-statistics associated with 
each of the six models tested is indicating the significance of all models at a confidence level of 95%. The results of 
the table indicate that there is a reverse significant relationship between information relevance (IR) and disclosure 
quality (DQ) with the agency costs criteria. 
Table 2. Result of regression models 4 and 5 
 
Operating expenses to sales ratios Asset turnover ratios Tobin’s Q ratios 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 Model 5 
IR 4.935×10-8* - -4.723×10-7* - -7.471×10-7* - 
DQ - -0.001* - 0.003* - 0.007* 
R2adj 0.058 0.069 0.125 0.040 0.080 0.052 
F-statistics 5.951* 6.967* 12.445* 4.324* 7.982* 5.396* 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1IRi,t + σ Ⱦହ୬ୀଶ n Control Variables + İi,t                     (4) 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1DQi,t + σ Ⱦହ୬ୀଶ c  Control Variables + İi,t                   (5) 
The simultaneous effects of accruals quality (AQ1), accruals quality adjusted for performance (AQ2) and 
information relevance (IR) on the agency costs criteria are shown in Table 3. The amount of F-statistics associated 
with each of the six models is indicating the significance of all models at the confidence level of 95 %. The results 
indicate that there is a reverse significant relationship between accruals quality (AQ1) and information relevance 
(IR) with the agency costs criteria. Also, Table 3 shows that there is a reverse significant relationship between 
accruals quality adjusted for performance (AQ2) and the agency costs criteria (i.e., asset turnover ratios, and Tobin’s 
 
 
† Due to the page limitations, the results of control variables were not presented in this article. 
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Q ratios), but, there is no significant relationship between accruals quality adjusted  for  the firm’s performance 
(AQ2), and the operating expenses to sales ratios. 
Table 3. Result of regression models 6 and 7 
 
Operating expenses to sales ratios Asset turnover ratios Tobin’s Q ratios 
Model 6 Model 7 Model 6 Model 7 Model 6 Model 7 
AQ1 4.826×10-8* - -6.332×10-7* - -1.223×10-6* - 
AQ2 - 4.179×10-8 - -4.916×10-7* - -1.630×10-6* 
IR 3.884×10-8* 4.426×10-8* -3.343×10-7* -4.124×10-7* -4.807×10-7* -5.486×10-7* 
R2adj 0.066 0.064 0.192 0.170 0.131 0.186 
F-statistics 5.689* 5.580* 16.900* 14.729* 11.095* 16.285* 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1AQ1i,t + ȕ2IRi,t + σ Ⱦ଺୬ୀଷ n Control Variables + İi,t                         (6) 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1AQ2i,t + ȕ2IRi,t +  σ Ⱦ଺୬ୀଷ n Control Variables + İi,t                        (7) 
The simultaneous effects of accruals quality (AQ1), disclosure quality (DQ) (model 8), and accruals quality 
adjusted for performance (AQ2) and disclosure quality (DQ) (model 9), along with information relevance (IR) and 
disclosure quality (DQ) (model 10), on the agency costs criteria within the context of the public policy decisions are 
shown in Table 4.  The amount of F-statistics associated with each of the nine models tested is indicating the 
significance of all models at the confidence level of 95%. The results of Table 4 indicate that there is a reverse 
significant relationship between accruals quality (AQ1), accruals quality adjusted for performance (AQ2), 
information relevance (IR) and disclosure quality (DQ) with the agency costs criteria. 
Table 4. Result of regression models 8, 9, and 10 
 
Operating expenses to sales ratios Asset turnover ratios Tobin’s Q ratios 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
AQ1 6.165×10-8* - - -7.904×10-7* - - -1.421×10-6* - - 
AQ2 - 4.807×10-8* - - -5.892×10-7* - - -1.738×10-6* - 
DQ -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 0.003* 0.003* 0.002* 0.006* 0.006* 0.005* 
IR - - 3.912×10-8* - - -4.447×10-7* - - -6.662×10-7* 
R2adj 0.085 0.078 0.085 0.159 0.108 0.131 0.131 0.177 0.093 
F-stat. 7.200* 6.678* 7.170* 13.667* 9.098* 11.098* 11.066* 15.325* 7.856* 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1AQ1i,t + ȕ2DQi,t + σ Ⱦ଺୬ୀଷ n Control Variables + İi,t                       (8) 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1AQ2i,t + ȕ2DQi,t +  σ Ⱦ଺୬ୀଷ n Control Variables + İi,t                      (9) 
ACi,t = ȕ0 + ȕ1IRi,t + ȕ2DQi,t +  σ Ⱦ଺୬ୀଷ n Control Variables + İi,t                          (10) 
Table 5 presents the results of related simultaneous evaluation of the holistic effects of all earnings information 
quality criteria together with other controlling factors, on agency costs. It specifically demonstrates simultaneous 
effects of accruals quality (AQ1), disclosure quality (DQ) and information relevance (IR) (in model 11) and accruals 
quality adjusted for performance (AQ2), disclosure quality (DQ) and information relevance (IR) (in model 12), on 
the agency costs criteria .The amount of F-statistics associated with each of the six models  tested is indicating the 
significance of all models at the confidence level of 95%. The results of Table 5 indicate that there is a reverse 
significant relationship between accruals quality (AQ1) and the agency costs criteria (i.e., operating expenses to 
sales ratios, asset turnover ratios, and Tobin’s Q ratios). Also, there is a reverse significant relationship between 
information relevance (IR) and the agency costs criteria (i.e., asset turnover ratios, and Tobin’s Q ratios), but, there 
is no significant relationship between information relevance (IR) and operating expenses to sales ratios. In addition, 
there is a reverse significant relationship between disclosure quality (DQ) and the agency costs criteria (i.e., 
operating expenses to sales ratios and Tobin’s Q ratios), but, there is no significant relationship between disclosure 
quality (DQ) and the asset turnover ratio. The result of testing regression model 12 also indicates that there is a 
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individually. Since management’s decisions are affected by companies’ agency costs, it can be inferred that 
higher earnings quality information, will lower the costs of the agency and hence the costs of the decisions.  
2) When simultaneous effects of the combination of two preceding qualitative characteristics of the earnings 
quality information were examined on the agency costs of the organizations, again a reverse relationship among 
selected characteristics of the earnings information and firms’ agency costs measures were found. The only 
exception was the criterion of AQ2 when it was considered with IR, which did not produce a significant 
relationship with ES. This situation was due to a weak relationship between AQ1 and ES. The implication of 
this finding on the management’s decisions is also the same as the preceding conclusion, but on a lower scale. 
3) When comprehensive models were exerted in which all independent, dependent and control variables were 
considered simultaneously,  the followings were found  for each criterion of the  earnings  quality : 
A. There was a reverse significant relationship between AQ1 criterion and agency cost measures. 
B. There was a reverse significant relationship between AQ2 and agency costs measures (for the asset 
turnover ratio, and Q-Tobin ratio), but the relationship between AQ2 and ES was not significant. 
C. There was a reverse significant relationship between IR and agency costs measures (for the asset turnover 
ratio, and Tobin’s Q ratio), but the relationship between IR and ES was not significant. This latter 
relationship, however, is almost positive at 90% confidence interval. The reason for the weak relationship 
of the IR lies on the existence of DQ variable and the effect of its components (reliability and relevancy) 
in the model. Since the reliability and relevancy criterion posit a reverse relationship with each other, the 
overall role of the IR has been reduced in the model.  
D. There was a reverse significant relationship between DQ and agency costs (for the ratio of operating 
expenses to sales, and Tobin’s Q ratio); but the relationship between DQ and TA is not statistically 
significant at 95% confidence interval. This latter relationship, however, is positive and significant at 90% 
confidence interval. The reason for the existence of a weak relation lies in the points which were raised in 
part C above. In this case, disclosure of earnings quality affects management’s decisions via agency costs. 
4) The extent of the effect of each information on earnings quality criteria on the agency costs is different. Since, the 
effect of each information quality criteria on the companies’ agency costs are different, their implications on the 
management’s decisions would also be different. 
This study provides several contributions. First it presents vivid empirical evidence concerning major effects of 
the earnings information in a developing market. It clearly reveals that, in the TSE, just like developed markets, 
even though most of its companies are governmental oriented, there is a reverse effect between earnings information 
criteria and firms’ agency costs. Therefore, there is no significant difference between this market and other 
developed markets from this aspect. It also unambiguously showed that the effects of the information of earnings 
quality criterion on the firms’ agency costs depends on: 1) identifying detailed characteristics of the earnings 
information criterion, 2) designating various components of the agency costs, 3) considering appropriate extraneous 
variables, and 4) designing appropriate models to capture the relation between financial earnings quality criteria and 
agency costs. Finally, this study extended the concepts of the quality of earnings and agency costs, and has 
therefore, moved the frontier of the knowledge in the domain of accounting, management, and finance decisions. 
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